Rewards decrease risky decisions for adolescent drivers: Implications for crash prevention

Motor vehicle crashes (MVCs) are a major contributor to adolescent mortality. Adolescent drivers are more likely to make risky decisions in the presence of peers. However, rewards have also been shown to improve decision making in adolescence. Our goal was to determine if peer observation and reward effects on decision-making were dependent upon adolescent driving styles.Twenty-four healthy adolescents played a driving game in a 2 (no peer; peer) × 2 (no rewards; rewards) within-subjects experiment. Driving styles were measured by self-report.Rewards favoring safe choices reduced risky decision making, but this effect was especially robust for adolescents with driving styles that increase risk of MVCs (i.e., dangerous, fast, angry, or distracted styles). Findings suggest that rewards for safe driving can be an effective mechanism for reducing MVCs, especially for the most at-risk drivers, if they can be made appetizing to adolescents.     

Decision-makers use social information to update their preferences but choose for others as they do for themselves

People's risky decisions are susceptible to the social context in which they take place. Across three experiments using different paradigms, we investigated the influence of three social factors upon participants' decisions: the recipient of the decision-making outcome (self, other, or joint), the nature of the relationship with the other agent (friend, stranger, or teammate), and the type of information that participants received about others' preferences: none at all, general information about how previous participants had decided, or information about a specific partner's preference. We found that participants' decisions about risk did not differ according to whether the outcome at stake was their own, another agent's, or a joint outcome, nor according to the type of information available. Participants did, however, adjust their preferences for risky options in light of social information.     

元认知中自信心对联合决策的预测作用

元认知通常指个体对自身认知活动的主观判断, 自信心作为其指标之一, 对个体认识和调节自己的行为有重要作用。研究表明自信心指标在联合研究过程中常见的任务类型涉及基础和高级心理加工过程, 此外, 自信心对联合决策的预测逐渐向基于计算模型的探索性参数变化。最后, 自信心的神经生理研究发现了前额叶皮层及其相关脑区和后顶叶皮层的重要性。今后应注重探索可能的预测参数和模型, 优化自信心对联合决策的预测作用。     

Confidence in judgments based on incomplete information: An investigation using both hypothetical and real gambles

This study assessed how confidence in judgments is affected by the need to make inferences about missing information. Subjects indicated their likelihood of taking each of a series of gambles based on both probability and payoff information or only one of these sources of information. They also rated their confidence in each likelihood judgment. Subjects in the Explicit Inference condition were asked to explicitly estimate the values of missing information before making their responses while subjects in the Implicit Inference condition were not. The manner in which probability information was framed was also manipulated. Experiment 1 employed hypothetical gambles and Experiment 2 employed gambles with real money. Expressed likelihood of taking gambles was higher when probability was phrased in terms of '% chance of winning' rather than '% chance of losing', but this difference was somewhat less with real gambles than with hypothetical gambles. Confidence ratings in each experiment were actually higher on incomplete information trials than on complete information trials in the Explicit Inference condition. Results were related to the general issue of confidence in judgments.     

Effectiveness of the GOFER course in decision making for high school students

The paper describes and evaluates the GOFER course in decision making for high school students (Mann, Harmoni and Power, 1988). The course was based on principles from the conflict theory of decision making (Janis and Mann, 1977) and was designed to provide adolescents with an understanding of factors that produce good and poor decision making as well as knowledge and practice of sound decision skills. Two evaluation studies were conducted to examine effectiveness of the course. Study 1 was conducted with young adolescents (12 year olds). It found a significant difference between students trained in the course and a control group on measures of self-esteem as a decision maker, self reported decision habits and knowledge of decision strategy. Study 2 was conducted with mid-adolescents (15 year olds). It, too, found a significant difference between students who took the course and a control group on measures of self esteem as a decision maker and self-reported decision habits. It is concluded that while the evaluation study fell short of an ideal test, the GOFER course met the criteria of improving student knowledge, raising confidence in decision making and changing self reported decision habits.     

Theory change in immunology part II: The clonal selection theory

This two-part article examines the competition between the clonal selection theory and the instructive theory of the immune response from 1957–1967. In Part I the concept of a temporally extended theory is introduced, which requires attention to the hitherto largely ignored issue of theory individuation. Factors which influence the acceptability of such an extended theory at different temporal points are also embedded in a Bayesian framework, which is shown to provide a rational account of belief change in science. In Part II these factors, as elaborated in the Bayesian framework, are applied to the case of the success of the clonal selection theory and the failure of the instructive theory.     

Minimizing the number of observations: A generalization of the spearman-brown formula

A new method for determining the minimum number of observations per subject needed to achieve a specific generalizability coefficient is presented. This method, which consists of a branch-and-bound algorithm, allows for the employment of constraints specified by the investigator.     

THE CREATIONISTS

Abstract. As the crusade to outlaw the teaching of evolution changed to a battle for equal time for creationism, the ideological defenses of that doctrine also shifted from primarily biblical to more scientific grounds. This essay describes the historical development of "scientific creationism" from a variety of late–nineteenth– and early–twentieth–century creationist reactions to Charles Darwin's theory of evolution, through the Scopes trial and the 1960s revival of creationism, to the current spread of strict creationism around the world.     

Empirical tests of scientific realism: A quantitative framework

The scientific realism debate in philosophy of science raises some intriguing methodological issues. Scientific realism posits a link between a scientific theory's observational and referential success. This opens the possibility of testing the thesis empirically, by searching for evidence of such a link in the record of theories put forward in the history of science. Many realist philosophers working today propose case study methodology as a way of carrying out such a test. This article argues that a qualitative method such as case study methodology is not adequate for this purpose, for two reasons: to test scientific realism is to pose an effects-of-causes question, and observational and referential success are quantities that theories possess to a greater or lesser degree. The article concludes that an empirical test of scientific realism requires a quantitative method.     

Why philosophy needs a concept of progress

This paper defends the usefulness of the concept of philosophical progress and the common assumption that philosophy and science aim to make the same, or a comparable, kind of progress. It does so by responding to Yafeng Shan's (2022) arguments that the wealth of research on scientific progress is not applicable or useful to philosophy, and that philosophy doesn't need a concept of progress at all. It is ultimately argued that while Shan's arguments are not successful, they reveal the way forward in developing accounts of philosophical progress.